Over the past few years, I’ve watched governments around the world race to build their own semiconductor industries.
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The logic is easy to understand. If semiconductors are the foundation of artificial intelligence, advanced manufacturing and national security, then building more chip capacity seems like the obvious path to long-term competitiveness.
The viewBut the more I watched this unfold, the more I found myself wondering whether we were trying to replicate the wrong thing.
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One or two sentences that set up who is talking and why it matters now.
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Where does the story usually begin?
It struck me that we often tell Taiwan’s story from the point where it became successful. We begin with TSMC, with advanced manufacturing, with technological leadership. In other words, we begin at the peak.
And what does that leave out?
They rest on foundations that have been built over years, often decades, and those foundations are usually invisible by the time the rest of the world notices them.
The sources of competitive advantage are often invisible until success makes them obvious.
So what was Taiwan really building?
It built the capabilities that allowed a semiconductor industry to emerge—and, just as importantly, to keep evolving as the world changed.